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The Bretton Woods system broke down in 1971 and since that time the
developing countries have faced serious problems in keeping their exchange
rates stable.

Since 1975, the situation has become more difficult with

acce 1erat i ng i nfl at i on rates in many i ndust ri a 1 count ri es.

To meet these

problems, the major industrial countries opted for free floating currencies
and the developing countries opted for either pegging their currencies to
some major currencies or fixing the exchange rate of their currencies visa-vis a basket of major currencies.

In addition to exchange rate problems,

the developing countries al so suffered from chronic monetary
d i sequ i 1 i bri urn, whi ch is

refl ected in tiomest i c i nfl at i on.

As i nfl at ion

has eroded the competitive edge of exports, the balance of payments
deteriorated, and the fixed exchange rate was overvalued, generating such
ill egal practices as underinvoicing exports and overinvoicing imports.
These phenomena support the monetarist proposition that a domestic monetary
disequilibrium will have spillover effects on both the balance of payments
and on the exchange rate.

I n the case of a fi xed exchange rate regime, a

continuous monetary disequilibrium creates a black market exchange rate.
This black market exchange rate prevails in almost all developing countries
and India is no exception (Pick, 1975).

But 1 ittle attenton has been paid

to the prob 1em of a black market exchange rate, a 1 though theory suggests
that a continuous deviation of the bl ack market exchange rate from the
official rate drains the country·s foreign exchange reserve.

The premium

for the bl ack market exchange rate is the di fference between the bl ack
market rate and the official rate when the transaction cost is not
significant.

This premium induces remittances through unofficial channels.

The country loses the precious foreign exchange in this process.

The

seri ousness of thi s issue ca 11 s for an ana 1yt i ca 1 as we 11 as empi ri ca 1
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study of the behavior of the black market exchange rate under the pressure
of domestic monetary disequi 1 ibrium.

The present paper is addressed to

thi s prob 1 em.
Apart from the black market exchange rate, the deve 1 opi ng countri es
a 1 so experi ence the operat i on of a para 11 e 1 market of commodi ties.

Thi s

ill egal market is the product of excessive government control exercised
both in the domest i c front and in the i nternat i ona 1 1 eve 1.

The domest i c

black market plays a complementary role to the operation of the black
market exchange rate.

The 1 inkage of

~hese

markets suggests that the

demand for cash balance in the domestic market is influenced by variables
which are not taken care of in traditional theories.

An integrated

approach incorporating the bl ack market in the consumer decision-making
process can capture the linkage between the two markets.

The present study

is also addressed to this problem.
The theory of black market behavior has been developed in the
literature in response to the existence of a widespread black market after
Worl d War II (e.g., Boul ding 1947; Bronfenbrenner 1947; Pl umptre 1947;
Michaely 1954).

Later on, the analysis has been extended to the behavior

of bl ack market exchange rate (e.g., Cul bertson, Jr. 1975, Bl ejer 1978a,
1978b, Gupta 1980, Dicki and Noursi 1975, Dornbusch and others 1983).
A1 though B1 ej er ha s extended the moneta ri st framework to exp 1 a in i ng
the bl ack market exchange rate behavior, Gupta has developed a model to
take care of the operation of

black market money for the Indian economy.

But there is no attempt in the literature to integrate the operation of a
parall el economy in the domestic market with the behavior of the bl ack
market exchange rate.

The present paper is an attempt to bridge that gap.
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Section II contains the theoretical framework analyzing the behavior
of India's black market exchange rate.

A model is developed in this

sec t ion wit h the 0 bj e c t i v e 0 fin t e g rat i ng the par all e 1 e con omy wit h the
official market.

This integration is supposed to explain the black market

exchange rate behavior in a better way. Section III contains the empirical
results obtained in this study.

The next section, in the form of a

conclusion, explains the implications of the results obtained.
SECTION II.

A MODEL OF BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR

A black market for a commodity emerges when the government restricts
the transaction of a commodity either in the form of quantity restriction,
or in the form of a minimum price, and the market forces become
i ncons i stent wi th that sort of rest ri ct ions for along time.

The

persistence of a black market illustrates the government's inattention to
the operation of market forces and also the government's silent tolerance
of a bl ack market operation. The wide range of restrictions has created
and perpetuated a pa ra 1 1e 1 economy in I nd i a.

The resu 1t has been that the

consumption basket of an individual now consists of broadly two types of
commodities:

commodity purchased in the official market and commodity

purchased in the black market.
Let us assume that in the model economy three commodities exist:
M0 ney (M), the c 0 mm 0 d i t y a v ail a b 1 e i nth e 0 f f i cia 1 mar ke t ( X), and the
commodity available in the black market (B).

We also assume that the black

market means bl ack market of smuggl ed goods only, which fall s into the
category of traded goods. l

Also a commodity available in official market

(X) consists of both traded (XT) and nontraded goods (XN)' or

X = XT+ XN •

(l )
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Following the standard convention in the 1 iterature, money is hel d as a
durable producer and consumer good which gives its holder a service. 2 The
flow of these services derived by an individual can be written as

z = z(!i),

• ••

(2)

P

where ~ is the stock of real cash balance.
P

PRICE LEVEL
The aggregate price 1 evel is the weighted average of prices of both
official goods (X) and black market goods {B) in
I-a

a

P = PX PB

• • • • • • • • • • •• (3)
'
where a is the proportion of total transaction carried through official

channel s.

As said above, the official goods (X) can be both traded and

nontraded goods and so the price of official goods (X) is a weighted
average of both these prices, or
Px

a

=

PXT PXN

I-a

'

• • • • • • • • • • ••

where a is the fract i on of tota 1 X whi ch is traded.

(4 )

Combi ni ng equat ions

(3) and (4) and transforming into logarithm, we have
ln P = aa ln PXT + a(l-a)ln PXN + (l-a)ln PB

• • • • • • • • ••

(5)

The international trade of this model economy is carried through two
channels--the official channel for which the price PXT is relevant, and the
black market or smuggl ing for which the price PB is relevant. Since PB is
the price of black market goods in domestic currency, we can write
1 The division of traded and nontraded goods fol lows the standard norm
in the literature, as Riley (1982).

2 See Friedman (1956), Patinkin (1965) and Klein (1974).
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(6)

where P*B is the price of black market goods in foreign currency and is
exogenous to the system, and Eb is the bl ack market exchange rate.
Similarly, the domestic price of traded goods, PXT ' can be written as

* • Eo '
PXT = PXT
wher e Eo i s the

0ff

(7)

i cia 1 ex c han gera tea nd P~ Tis the wo r 1 d Pric e 1 eve 1 •

Further, we can substitute both P~ and P~T by the common world price level
PW' as both refer to world price of traded goods, or
(8)
P*XT = P*B = PW·
We further assume that the price of nontraded goods moves monotonically

with price of traded goods, or
1n PXN = a • 1n PXT '

(9)

where "a" is the factor of proportionality.
Now by substitution from equations (6) to (9) into equation (5), we
can write after manipulation,
ln P = (aa + aa - aaa + l-a)ln Pw + (aa + aa - aaa)ln Eo
+ (l-a)ln Eb •

• • • • (10)

Equation (10) states that the domestic price level is the weighted average
of the worl d price 1 evel, the offici al exchange rate, and bl ack market
exchange rate.
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION AND DEMAND FOR MONEY
From the standpoint of an individual, the demand for money along with
the demand for other commodities are determined through an optimizing
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decision-making process. 3 The individual's util ity function can be written
as

U = U(X, B, Z),

• • • • (11)

where X equals the rate of consumption of commodity services purchased in
the official market, B equals the rate of consumption of commodity services
purchased in the black market, and Z equals the rate of consumption of
monetary services.
The flow of both X and W that are consumed per unit of time by an
individual is a function of the rate of net rupee receipt to the
individual.

The budget constraint of the 'individual can be written as

Px • X + PB • B = PY + iW,

(12)

where Px and PB are prices of X and B, Y is real income, i is the rate of
interest, and W is the rupee value of investment in bond.
It is assumed that the individual has a given total of real nonhuman
wealth (A) defined as
A=!i+~

P

P

. . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 )

Combining equations (12) and (13), we obtain

Px • X + PB • B = PY + i(AP-M) ,

. . . . . . . . . . . . (14)

which is the budget constraint.
Individuals maximize their utility subject to their given real human
and nonhuman wealth and to the budget constraint.

We can form the

Lagrangian as fol lows:

L = U(X,B,Z) + A(PY + iAP - iM - Px • X + PB · B)

• • • • • • • (15)

3 This optimizing framework, though in 1 ine with standard theory,
takes care of the existence of the black market where the individual as a
rational agent al locates expenditures among commodities purchased from two
types of markets -- the official market and the black market.
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From the first-order conditions, and assuming that second-order conditions
are satisfied, we can write
A=

=

• • (16)

=--i

Equation (16) states the familiar condition that the marginal utility
derived from every good divided by its price must be the same for all
goods.

The price of services from money is the interest rate.

If we assume that permanent income Yp can be considered as the
relevant empirical constraint (that is, proxy for Y and A), then the

.

conditions of utility maximization imply that the demand for real cash
balances may be written as follows: 4
. . . . . . . . . . . . (17)

where af/ay p > 0, af/aPX > 0, af/aP B >
and

°

af / ai < 0.

From equations (3), (6), and (8) by substitution of the values of Px and
PB, we can write equation (17) as fol lows:

(~)d = g(Y p '
P

i, Eb' Pw).

• • • • • • • • • (18)

Equation (18) can be written in log-linear form as 5
ln Md = al ln y + a2 ln i + a3 ln P + a4 ln Eb + a5 ln Pw' • • • • • • • • • (19)
where al > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0, a4 > 0, and a5 < 0.
An increase in the real income will increase the demand for cash balance,
4 This follows Klein (1974, p. 933), and it is different from the
conventional formulation in the literature, as in Laidler (1966).
5 Here we assume that the essential features of the nonlinear
funct ion in Equat ion (18) can be di scerned by s,tudyi ng the propert i es of
the linearized model (Equation [19J). The difficul tyin this approach is
the possibi 1 ity of distorting critical model nonl inearities in the
linearization stage. But linearization is done on the belief that models
are often only mildly nonlinear. See Kuh and Neese (1982).
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while an increase in the rate of interest implies an increasing opportunity
cost of ho 1 ding cash ba 1 ance; so the demand for rea 1 cash ba 1 ance wi 11
fall.

An increase in the value of Eb will increase the price level which

wi 11 inc rease the demand for nomi na 1 cash ba 1 ance.

Aga in, an inc rease in

the world price level compared to the domestic price level will appreciate
the exchange rate in the black market.

This will put downward pressure on

the price level and the demand for cash balance will be lower.
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MONEY MARKET
I tis ass umedt hat m0 ney s t 0 c kin ex 'i s ten c e ad jus t s tot he qua ntit y
demanded, which reflects the long-run tendency of the money market to move
to the equilibrium or,
. . . • . . • . . . • • (20)

where Ms is the quantity of money suppl ied, which is exogenous to the
system.

Through the money market equi 1 ibrium price 1 evel wi 11 be

determined and thus we obtain from the solution of equations (19) and (20),
which is
1n P

=-

1

a1

a2

1 n M- -

a3

1n y - -

a3

a4

1n i - -

a3

a5

1 n Eb - -

a3

a3

1 n Pw • (21)

Substituting the value of ln P from equation (21) into equation (10), we
obtain the equation of black market exchange rate as fol lows:
1
1n Eb

= -8-

- -

a3
8

1n M

-

al
8

ln y

a2
-8-

ln

a5

[ - + aa + aa(l-a) + 1 - aJln Pw

a3

a3
- 8

[aa + aa(l-a)Jln Eo '

. • • • . . . . • . . . (22)
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where e = a3(I-a) + a4' which is positive.

From equation (22), we can

write the black market exchange rate equation in estimable form as fol lows:
ln Eb = hlln M + h2ln y + h3 ln i + h4ln Pw + h5 ln Eo'
where the presumptive sign of the hils are

•• (23)

hI > 0, h2 < 0, h3 > 0, h4 < 0, h5 < 0.
Equation (23) gives the determinant of black market exchange rate, which
are the nominal cash balance, the real income, the interest rate, the
official exchange rate, and the world price level.

An increase in the

money supply in the domestic market is expected to lead to a depreciation
of the black market exchange rate.

An increase in real income will lead to

an increase in the demand for money, which will lead to an appreciation of
the black market exchange rate.

The term h3 captures the effect of the

interest rate on the black market exchange rate.
wi 1 1 red uc e the d em and for m0 ney •

A hi gher interest rate

I·n the a bsen ceo f cap ita 1 flo w, t his

will lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate. Again, any adjustment of
the official exchange rate in response to domestic monetary disequilibrium
is expected to reduce the pressure on the black market exchange rate.
Lastly, an increase in the world price level compared to the domestic one
will appreciate the black market exchange rate.
SECTION III
I nth iss ec t ion,
presented.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

the re g res s ion est i ma teo f eq uat ion (23) i s

The period of estimation covers from the first quarter of 1954

to the last quarter of 1980.

The data for black market exchange rates (Eb)

are cDl lected from Pickls Currency Yearbook and constitute quarterly
average of monthly data.

The data of quarterly national income are

estimated from annual figures fol lowing the method of Boot and others
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(1967).

All other data are collected from International Financial

Statistics, published by the International Monetary Fund.

For the variable

money stock, two definitions of money are used, while Ml consists of
currency and demand deposits, the broad definition of money M2 consists of
Ml plus quasi-money, the latter include time deposit in the commercial
bank.
The U.S. consumer price index has been taken as the proxy of world
price level. The official exchange rate has varied little during the major
peri od of the study, i.e., from 1954 to 1971.

The se 1 1 i ng rate of the

rupee as reported in International Financial Statistics is used here.
To take care of possible seasonality in the data, three seasonal
dummies have been used in the tradition of coadjustment of data (Laffer and
Rauson, 1971).
Table 1 presents the estimates of equation (23) with Ml definitions of
money. The coefficients of dummy variables

are not significant, which

imply the absence of significant seasonal ity in the data.

The value of

adjusted R2 is high and the Dunbin-Watson statistic is 1.32, which suggests
some serial first-order autocorrelation.
All the variables have the coefficients with the appropriate sign
except the rate of interest and rea 1 income.

The coeffi c i ent of rate of

interest is not significant from zero. Again, the coefficient of income
has been positive and significant, which is contrary to expectation.
Table 2 presents the estimates of equation (23) with M2 definition of
money.

There are two differences which result from using M1 definitions:

First, the sign of the coefficient for the rate of interest is negative,
but again not significant.

Again, the coefficient of real income is
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Table 1.

Estimate of the Equation (23)
M1 Definition of Money

Independent
Variable
Intercept
1n
1n
1n
1n
1n

01

M
Y
r

Eo
Pw

02

03

NOTE:

Co-efficient
2.67
0.58
0.74
0.26
0.34
-1.78
-0.04
-0.02
0.03

Standard
Error
1.22
0.17
0.25
0.20
0.10
0.19
0.03
0.03
0.03

t-statistics
2.18
3.47
2.95
1.32*
3.38
-9.24
-1.19*
-0.75*
0.80*

Other
Statistics
R2 = 0.86
R2 = 0.84

= 73.7
D.W. Statistics
= 1.32
F

* The t-statistics are not significant. Other t-statistics are
significant.
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Table 2.

Estimate of Equation (23)

M2 Definition of Money
Independent
Variable
Intercept
1n M
1n Y
1n r

1n Eo
1n Pw
01

02

03

NOTE:

Coefficient
5.27
0.82
0.40
-0.01
0.48
-2.26
-0.02
-0.01
0.02

Standard
Error
1.33
0.16
0.25
0.20
0.09
0.22
0.03
0.03
0.03

t-statistic
3.96
5.17
1.60**
-0.04*
5.42
-10.08
-0.63*
-0.39*
0.91*

* The t-statistics are not significant.
** Not significant at the 10% level.
Other t-statistics are significant.

Other
Statistics
R2 = 0.87
R2 = 0.86
F = 85.08
D.W. Statistic

= 1.38

•
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positive, but it is not significant from zero.

The sign of the coefficient

of real income may have the following impl ication:

the exchange rate

variation can better be explained if an analytical integration is possible
between the rea 1 factors and the monetary factors (G 1yfason

a

He 11 iwe 11 ,

1983).

SECTION IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper develops a model along monetarist lines for analyzing the
black market exchange rate behavior with special reference to India.

In

doing so, it has taken care of the operatlon of the bl ack market economy
and then it is integrated with the analysis of black market exchange rate
behavior.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime with widespread control over the
allocation of foreign exchange among competing uses, any disequilibrium in
the domestic money market in the form of excess supply of money leads to a
depreciation of the bl ack market exchange rate.

The

statistical study

reported in the earl ier section has supported this theoretical position.
In the face of a fixed exchange rate, the expansion of domestic money
supply has another effect and that is on the balance of payments, which is
reflected in the variation of foreign exchange reserve.

Although this

is

a familiar result of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, the
discrepancy of the black market exchange rate from the official exchange
rate, which is the central theme of this paper, will induce underinvoicing
of exports and/or overinvoicing of imports.

The latter changes the

official foreign exchange reserve in an indirect way.

On this point, the

government should take care of the growth of domestic credit component of
the monetary base, as through this it can control the money supply.

A
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successful control on the money supply will keep the domestic price level
in line compared to the world price level and the deviation of the black
market exchange rate from the official rate will be minimum.
policy implication of this paper.

This is the
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